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Generalization of Rashmi-Shah-Kumar
Minimum-Storage-Regenerating Codes
Masazumi Kurihara and Hidenori Kuwakado
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a generalized version of the Rashmi-Shah-Kumar Minimum-Storage-Regenerating(RSK-
MSR) codes based on the product-matrix framework. For any (n, k, d) such that d ≥ 2k − 2 and d ≤ n − 1, we
can directly construct an (n, k, d) MSR code without constructing a larger MSR code and shortening of the larger
MSR code. As a result, the size of a finite field over which the proposed code is defined is smaller than or equal
to the size of a finite field over which the RSK-MSR code is defined. In addition, the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure codes based
on the generalized RSK-MSR codes can be obtained by applying the construction method of {ℓ, ℓ′} secure codes
proposed by Shah, Rashmi and Kumar. Furthermore, the message matrix of the (n, k, d) generalized RSK-MSR code
is derived from that of the RSK-MSR code by using the construction method of the {ℓ = k, ℓ′ = 0} secure code.
Index Terms
Distributed storage, regenerating codes, Minimum-Storage-Regenerating codes(MSR codes), Rashmi-Shah-Kumar
MSR codes(RSK-MSR codes), generalized RSK-MSR codes, secure regenerating codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dimakis, Godfrey, Wu, Wainwright and Ramchandran introduced a concept of regenerating codes into distributed
storage systems [1]. Under the concept, a regenerating code with six parameters (n, k, d, α, β,B) has two properties
of reconstruction and regeneration as follows. A message consists of B message symbols over a finite field Fq with
q elements. The message is encoded to n shares in such a way that the message can be reconstructed from any
k shares, and the n shares are stored across n storage nodes in a distributed storage system. Each share consists
of α symbols over Fq , i.e., we assume that the storage capacity of each node is α symbols. A data collector is
permitted to connect to any k active nodes to reconstruct the message, and downloads the k shares from the k nodes.
Then, the data collector can reconstruct the message from the k shares. Furthermore, a failed node is permitted to
connect to any d active nodes, which are called helper nodes, to regenerate the share as was stored in itself, and
downloads data consisting of β symbols over Fq from each helper node. As a result, the failed node obtains the
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2downloaded data of total amount dβ, and can regenerate the share from the downloaded data, i.e., the failed node
can be repaired. The total amount dβ of the downloaded data for repair is called the repair-bandwidth.
Dimakis et al. [1] also showed that there is a fundamental tradeoff between storage α and repair-bandwidth
dβ. In the optimal tradeoff, there are Minimum Storage Regenerating(MSR) codes and Minimum Bandwidth
Regenerating(MBR) codes as optimal regenerating codes. In particular, an (n, k, d) MSR code with (α, β,B)
satisfies the following optimal condition.
(α, β) =
(
B
k
,
B
k(d− k + 1)
)
. (1)
When the value of β is equal to one, i.e., β = 1, the parameters α and B are uniquely decided as follows:
α = d− k + 1, (2)
B = kα = k(d− k + 1). (3)
In this paper, we focus on a construction of MSR codes. The constructions of MSR codes are proposed in [2]–[4].
Rashmi, Shah and Kumar proposed a construction of (n, k, d = 2k − 2) MSR codes based on product-matrix
framework, where d ≤ n − 1 and β = 1 [2, Sec. V] (see Table I). Furthermore, for any (n, k, d) such that
d ≥ 2k− 2 and d ≤ n− 1, an (n, k, d) MSR code with β = 1 is derived from a larger (n′ = n+(d− 2k+2), k′ =
k + (d− 2k + 2), d′ = d+ (d− 2k + 2)) MSR code by using a procedure of shortening of the larger MSR code,
where d′ = 2k′ − 2 [4, Sec. V-C, Corollary 8] (see Table II). The larger (n′, k′, d′) MSR code can be constructed
by [2, Sec. V]. In particular, in this paper, the MSR code is called a Rashmi-Shah-Kumar(RSK) MSR code, i.e.,
RSK-MSR code.
Suh and Ramchandran [3] and Shah, Rashmi, Kumar and Ramchandran [4] proposed MSR codes based on
interference alignment techniques. Suh and Ramchandran proposed a construction of (2k, k, d = 2k − 1) MSR
codes, which are called Exact-Repair MDS codes, where q ≥ 2k and β = 1 [3, Sec. VI-A, Theorem 2] (see Table
I). Moreover, for any (n, k, d) such that n ≥ 2k and d ≥ 2k − 1, an (n, k, d) MSR code with β = 1 is derived
from a larger (n′ = 2(n− k), k′ = n− k, d′ = 2(n− k)− 1) MSR code by using procedures of removing nodes
and pruning equations, where d′ = 2k′ − 1 [3, Sec. VI-B, Theorem 3] (see Table II). The larger (n′, k′, d′) MSR
code can be constructed by [3, Sec. VI-A, Theorem 2].
On the other hand, Shah et al. proposed a construction of (2k, k, d = 2k − 1) MSR codes which are called
MISER codes1, where β = 1 [4, V-B] (see Table I). Furthermore, for any (n, k, d) such that n ≥ 2k and d = n−1,
an (n, k, d) MSR code with β = 1 is derived from a larger (n′ = n+(n−2k), k′ = k+(n−2k), d′ = d+(n−2k))
MSR code by using a procedure of shortening of the larger MSR codes, where d′ = 2k′ − 1 [4, Sec. V-C] (see
Table II)2. The (n′, k′, d′) MSR code can be constructed by [4, Sec. V-B]. The relation between codes of [4] and
[3] is written in [4, Sec. I-D and V-G] and [3, Sec. II-C].
1 Short for MDS, Interference-aligning, Systematic, Exact-Regenerating codes
2 Under the additional constraint in regeneration, Shah et al. showed the extension of the MISER code to the case 2k − 1 ≤ d ≤ n− 1 [4,
Sec. V-D].
3TABLE I
Relations of parameters and conditions of (n, k, d) MSR codes with β = 1 over Fq in [2]–[4].
Parameters (n, k, d) Conditions
Rashmi et al. (n, k, 2k − 2) d = 2k − 2, d ≤ n− 1,
[2, Sec. V] q ≥ n(d− k + 1)
Suh et al. (2k, k, 2k − 1) d = 2k − 1, d = n− 1,
[3, Sec. VI-A] q ≥ 2k
Shah et al. (2k, k, 2k − 1) d = 2k − 1, d = n− 1,
[4, Sec. V-B] q ≥ 2k †
Presented codes (n, k, d) d ≥ 2k − 2, d ≤ n− 1,
in this paper q ≥ n(d− k + 1)
† The minimum field size is derived from [4, Eq.(37)] as follows: q ≥ α+ n− k = n = 2k.
TABLE II
Relations of parameters and conditions of the larger (n′, k′, d′) MSR codes to construct the target (n, k, d) MSR codes with β = 1 over Fq
in [2]–[4], where i1 = d− 2k + 2 and i2 = n− 2k.
Parameters (n′, k′, d′) Conditions
Rashmi et al. (n+ i1, k + i1, d+ i1) d ≥ 2k − 2, d ≤ n− 1,
[2, Sec. V-C] q ≥ (n+ d− 2k + 2)(d − k + 1)
Suh et al. (2(n − k), n− k,2(n − k)− 1) d ≥ 2k − 1, n ≥ 2k,
[3, Sec. VI-B] q ≥ 2(n− k)
Shah et al. (n+ i2, k + i2, d+ i2) n ≥ 2k, d = n− 1,
[4, Sec. V-C] q ≥ 2(n− k)
In this paper, we propose a generalized version of RSK-MSR codes, which are based on product-matrix frame-
work, proposed by Rashmi et al. [2]. For any (n, k, d) such that d ≥ 2k−2 and d ≤ n−1, we can directly construct
an (n, k, d) MSR code with β = 1 without using processes of constructing a larger MSR code and shortening of
the larger MSR code (see Table I). We will call the presented code in this paper a generalized RSK-MSR code.
This paper is organized as follows: In section II, a construction of generalized RSK-MSR codes is proposed.
Furthermore, the reconstruction and regeneration of the code are described. In section III, examples of construction,
reconstruction and regeneration are given. In section IV, relations between generalized RSK-MSR codes and {ℓ, ℓ′}
secure codes are described. Finally, a conclusion is given in section V.
II. GENERALIZED RSK-MSR CODES
In this section, we propose a construction of (n, k, d) MSR code with β = 1 over Fq for any (n, k, d) such that
d ≥ 2k − 2 and d ≤ n− 1. Then, the remaining parameters α and B are uniquely determined from k, d and β as
follows: α = d− k + 1 and B = kα = k(d− k + 1).
4We assume that there are n storage nodes such as node i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, in a distributed storage system. The storage
capacity of each node is α symbols over Fq. Furthermore, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, assign an unique public symbol
xi in Fq to node i in such a way that the following conditions are satisfied.
1) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xi 6= 0,
2) For any i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, xαi 6= xαj if i 6= j.
From the condition of parameters q, n and α written in [2, Sec. V], if the condition, q ≥ nα, is true, then there
are at least n elements x1, . . . , xn in Fq such that xαi 6= xαj if i 6= j. The condition is the sufficient condition of
the existence of such n elements, but it is not the necessary condition of that (see Example in Section III).
In general, we can construct an (n, k, d) generalized RSK-MSR code over Fq , where q ≥ n(d− k + 1). On the
other hand, in the construction method proposed by Rashmi et al. [2], the target (n, k, d) RSK-MSR code can be
constructed by shortening a larger (n′ = n+ d− 2k + 2, k′ = d− k + 2, d′ = 2(d− k + 1)) RSK-MSR code over
Fq0 , where q0 ≥ n′(d′ − k′ + 1) = {n+ (d− 2k + 2)}(d− k + 1). Thus, the size of the finite field Fq is smaller
than or equal to that of the finite field Fq0 , since d ≥ 2k − 2.
A. Message Matrix M
Firstly, for given parameters k and d, we define five types of (d×(d−k+1)) message matrices M consisting of the
following sub-matrices. Note that the message matrix is also represented as a (d×α) matrix because α = d−k+1.
T1, T2 : ((k − 1)× (k − 1)) symmetric matrices,
U1 : a ((k − 1)× 1) matrix, i.e., a column vector of length k − 1,
U2 : a (1× 1) matrix, i.e., a scalar,
V1 : a ((k − 1)× (d− 2k + 1)) matrix,
V2 : a (1× (d− 2k + 1)) matrix, i.e., a row vector of length d− 2k + 1,
O1 : a ((d− 2k + 1)× (d− 2k + 1)) square zero matrix,
O2 : a ((k − 1)× (d− 2k + 2)) zero matrix.
1) Type I : When k ≥ 2 and d = 2k − 2, the message matrix is defined as
M =

 T1
T2

 . (4)
The message matrix of Type I is identical with that of the RSK-MSR code [2]. The message matrix is a
(d×(d−k+1)) matrix because d = 2k−2. Since T1 and T2 are ((k−1)×(k−1)) symmetric matrices, each
of the two matrices consists of k(k−1)/2 distinct entries. Thus, the message matrix consists of B = k(k−1)
distinct message symbols because B = k(d− k + 1) = k(k − 1) when d = 2k − 2.
2) Type II : When k ≥ 2 and d = 2k − 1, the message matrix is defined as
M =


T1 U1
U t1 U2
T2 O2

 , (5)
5where U t1 is the transpose of U1. The message matrix of Type II is a (d × (d − k + 1)) matrix because
d = 2k − 1. The sub-matrix
[
T1 U1
Ut
1
U2
]
of M is a (k × k) symmetric matrix and the (k × 1) sub-matrix[
U1
U2
]
consists of k entries. Thus, the message matrix consists of B = k2 distinct message symbols because
B = k(d− k + 1) = k2 when d = 2k − 1.
3) Type III : When k ≥ 2 and d ≥ 2k, the message matrix is defined as
M =


T1 U1 V1
U t1 U2 V2
V t1 V
t
2 O1
T2 O2


. (6)
The message matrix of Type III is a (d× (d − k + 1)) matrix. Since the sub-matrix
[
T1 U1 V1
Ut
1
U2 V2
V t
1
V t
2
O1
]
of M is a
((d − k + 1) × (d − k + 1)) symmetric matrix and the (k × (d − 2k + 2)) sub-matrix
[
U1 V1
U2 V2
]
consists of
k(d− 2k + 2) entries, the message matrix consists of B = k(k − d+ 1) distinct message symbols.
4) Type IV : When k = 1 and d = 1, the message matrix is defined as
M =
[
U2
]
. (7)
The message matrix of Type IV is a (d × (d − k + 1)) matrix because d − k + 1 = d = 1 when k = 1 and
d = 1. Thus, the message matrix consists of B = 1 message symbol because B = k(d − k + 1) = d = 1
when k = 1 and d = 1.
5) Type V : When k = 1 and d ≥ 2, the message matrix is defined as
M =

 U2 V2
V t2 O1

 . (8)
The message matrix of Type V is a (d× (d−k+1)) matrix because d−k+1 = d when k = 1. The message
matrix is a (d×d) symmetric matrix and the sub-matrix O1 is a ((d−1)× (d−1)) square zero matrix. Thus,
the message matrix consists of B = d distinct message symbols because B = k(d− k+1) = d when k = 1.
From the above definition, these five types of the message matrices for k and d are coordinated in Table III. The
message matrix of every type is a (d× (d− k + 1)) matrix and consists of B message symbols.
TABLE III
Types of the message matrices M for k and d such that d ≥ 2k − 2.
k = 1 (d = 1) (d ≥ 2)
IV V
k ≥ 2 (d = 2k − 2) (d = 2k − 1) (d ≥ 2k)
I II III
6B. Encoding and Share
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define a coding vector ρ
i
associated with node i as follows:
ρ
i
= [1, xi, x
2
i , . . . , x
d−1
i ] ∈ F
d, (9)
where xi is the element assigned to node i. The message consisting of B message symbols is encoded to n shares
by the coding vectors ρ
i
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the message matrix M . For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the share ci, which is
stored in node i, is defined by
ci = [ci,1, . . . , ci,α] = ρiM ∈ F
α. (10)
C. Reconstruction
In this section, we describe a reconstruction of the generalized RSK-MSR code. Before describing the recon-
struction, we write the coding vector and the share using the following two sub-vectors.
ωi = [1, xi, . . . , x
k−2
i ] ∈ F
k−1, (11)
θi = [1, xi, . . . , x
α−k−1
i ] ∈ F
α−k. (12)
1) In the case of Type I, the coding vector is represented as
ρ
i
= [1, . . . , xk−2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωi
, xk−1i , . . . , x
d−1
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
xα
i
ωi
],
where α = k − 1 because d = 2k − 2, and then, the components of the share are represented as
[ci,1, . . . , ci,α] = [ωi, x
α
i ωi]

 T1
T2

 .
2) In the case of Type II, the coding vector is represented as
ρ
i
= [1, . . . , xk−2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω
i
, xk−1i , x
k
i , . . . , x
d−1
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
xα
i
ω
i
],
where α = k because d = 2k − 1, and then, the components of the share are represented as
[ci,1, . . . , ci,α−1] = [ωi, x
α
i ωi]

 T1
T2

+ xk−1i U t1,
ci,α =
[
ωi, x
k−1
i
]  U1
U2

 .
3) In the case of Type III, the coding vector is represented as
ρ
i
= [1, . . . , xk−2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωi
, xk−1i , x
k
i , . . . , x
α−1
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
xk
i
θi
, xαi , . . . , x
d−1
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
xα
i
ωi
],
7where α ≥ k + 1 because d ≥ 2k, and then, the components of the share are represented as
[ci,1, . . . , ci,k−1] = [ωi, x
α
i ωi]

 T1
T2

+ [xk−1i , xki θi]

 U t1
V t1

 ,
ci,k =
[
ωi, x
k−1
i
] U1
U2

+ xki θiV t2 ,
[ci,k+1, . . . , ci,α] =
[
ωi, x
k−1
i
] V1
V2

 .
4) In the case of Type IV, the coding vector is represented as
ρ
i
= [1],
where k = 1 and d = 1, and then, the components of the share are represented as
ci,1 = U2.
5) In the case of Type V, the coding vector is represented as
ρ
i
= [1, xi, . . . , x
d−1
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
xiθi
],
where k = 1 and d ≥ 2, and then, the components of the share are represented as
ci,1 = U2 + xiθiV
t
2 ,
[ci,2, . . . , ci,α] = V2.
In the case of Type I, since the message matrix is identical with that of the RSK-MSR code, the data collector
can reconstruct the message from any k shares by using the method of MSR Data-Reconstruction proposed by
Rashmi et al. [2, Theorem 5].
In the case of Type IV, the data collector can reconstruct the message from any share ci without computing
because U2 = ci,1. Moreover, in the case of Type V, the data collector can reconstruct the message from any share
ci because V2 = [ci,2, . . . , ci,α] and U2 = ci,1 − xiθiV t2 .
We show the reconstruction for Type III in the following theorem. The reconstruction for Type II is included in
that for Type III.
Theorem 1 (Reconstruction for Type III). A data collector connecting any k nodes can reconstruct the B message
symbols from the k shares of the k nodes.
Proof. The data collector connects to k nodes {i1, . . . , ik} to reconstruct the message, and downloads the k shares
ci1 , . . . , cik .
8Decomposing k coding vectors ρ
i1
, . . . , ρ
ik
associated with the k nodes, we define the following three matrices.
ΩDC =


ωi1
.
.
.
ωik

 , xDC =


xk−1i1
.
.
.
xk−1ik

 , ΘDC =


xki1θi1
.
.
.
xkikθik

 , (13)
where ΩDC is a (k × (k − 1)) matrix, xDC is a column vector of length k and ΘDC is a (k × (α− k)) matrix.
(Step 1: Finding V1 and V2.) Firstly, the data collector solves the following system of linear equations.

ci1,k+1 . . . ci1,α
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
cik,k+1 . . . cik,α

 =
[
ΩDC xDC
]V1
V2

 . (14)
The left (k× k) matrix [ΩDC xDC] in the right-hand side of Eq.(14) is nonsingular, because the determinant of the
(k × k) matrix is the Vandermonde determinant from the condition of xi. Thus, the data collector can recover V1
and V2.
(Step 2: Finding U1 and U2.) Next, the data collector solves the following system of linear equations.

ci1,k
.
.
.
cik,k

−ΘDCV t2 =
[
ΩDC xDC
]U1
U2

 . (15)
Since the data collector knows V2 from the previous step and the (k×k) matrix [ΩDC xDC] is nonsingular, the data
collector can recover U1 and U2.
(Step 3: Finding T1 and T2.) Finally, the data collector recovers T1 and T2 in the right-hand side of Eq.(16)
by using the method of MSR Data-Reconstruction [2, Theorem 5], that is, T1 and T2 are recovered by using the
reconstruction method for Type I.

ci1,1 . . . ci1,k−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
cik,1 . . . cik,k−1

−
[
xDC ΘDC
]U t1
V t1

 = [ΩDC ΛDCΩDC]

T1
T2

 , (16)
where ΛDC is a (k×k) diagonal matrix with diagonal components xαi1 , . . . , x
α
ik
. Note that the right-hand of Eq.(16)
is corresponding to [2, Eq. (29)]. Since the data collector knows U1 and V1 from the previous steps, the data
collector can obtain the values in the left-hand side of Eq.(16). Thus, the data collector can recover T1 and T2 in
the right-hand side of Eq.(16) using the method of MSR Data-Reconstruction since the components in the right-hand
side of Eq.(16) satisfy the following conditions.
• ΩDC is (k × (k − 1)) matrix,
• ΛDC is a nonsingular (k × k) matrix from the condition of xi,
• T1 and T2 are ((k − 1)× (k − 1)) symmetric matrices,
• the ((k−1)× (k−1)) matrix [ωti1 . . . ω
t
ik−1
]t consisting of the first k−1 vectors ωi1 , . . . , ωik−1 is nonsingular
from the condition of xi.
9By the above three steps, the data collector can recover the message matrix M , that is, the data collector can
reconstruct the message consisting of B message symbols.
From Theorem 1, in the case of Type II, the data collector can reconstruct the message from any k shares by
the procedures of Step 2 and 3 in the proof of Theorem 1.
D. Regeneration
In this section, we describe a regeneration of the generalized RSK-MSR code, that is, a failed node f connecting
any d helper nodes can regenerate the share as was stored in itself prior to failure.
Firstly, we describe the regeneration for Type I, II and III. For each type, we define the sub-vector ϕ
i
of the
coding vector ρ
i
and the two sub-matrices W1 and W2 of the message matrix M , where ϕi is a vector of length
α, and W1 and W2 are respectively an (α× α) square matrix and a ((k − 1)× α) matrix.
1) In the case of Type I, the sub-vector ϕ
i
and the two sub-matrices W1, W2 are defined as
ϕ
i
= ωi ∈ F
α, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
W1 = T1,W2 = T2.
2) In the case of Type II, the sub-vector ϕ
i
and the two sub-matrices W1, W2 are defined as
ϕ
i
= [ωi, x
k−1
i ] ∈ F
α, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
W1 =

 T1 U1
U t1 U2

 ,W2 = [ T2 O2 ] .
3) In the case of Type III, the sub-vector ϕ
i
and the two sub-matrices W1, W2 are defined as
ϕ
i
= [ωi, x
k−1
i , x
k
i θi] ∈ F
α, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
W1 =


T1 U1 V1
U t1 U2 V2
V t1 V
t
2 O1

 ,W2 =
[
T2 O2
]
.
From the above definitions, the share cf of the failed node f is represented as follows:
cf = ϕfW1 + x
α
f ωfW2. (17)
The proof of the following thereom gives the regeneration method for Type I, II and III. The idea of the
regeneration method is derived from the method of MSR Exact-Regeneration proposed by Rashmi, et al. [2, Theorem
4].
Theorem 2 (Regeneration for Type I, II and III). A failed node connecting any d nodes can regenerate the share
as was stored in itself prior to failure.
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Proof. The failed node f connects d helper nodes {h1, · · · , hd} to regenerate the same share that was stored in
the failed node prior to failure, and downloads the following data for repair from each helper node. Each helper
node hp computes data df,hp for repair from chp and ϕf as follows:
df,hp = chpϕ
t
f
∈ F, (18)
where df,hp is a scalar because β = 1, and sends it to the failed node f . As a result, the failed node obtains data
of d symbols df,h1 , . . . , df,hd for repair such that

df,h1
.
.
.
df,hd

 =


ρ
h1
.
.
.
ρ
hd

Mϕtf ∈ Fd. (19)
Since the determinant of the leftmost (d × d) matrix in the right-hand side is the Vandermonde determinant from
the condition of xi, the (d× d) matrix is nonsingular. Thus, the failed node can obtain the following equation from
the above system. 

ρ
h1
.
.
.
ρ
hd


−1 

df,h1
.
.
.
df,hd

 = Mϕtf =

W1ϕtf
W2ϕ
t
f

 (20)
Since the matrix W1 is symmetric, we have (W1ϕtf )
t = ϕ
f
W1. Since W2ϕtf = T2ω
t
f and the matrix T2 is
symmetric, we have (W2ϕtf )
t = (T2ω
t
f )
t = ωfT2. Thus, the failed node can regenerate the share cf as follows:
(W1ϕ
t
f
)t + xαf
[
(W2ϕ
t
f
)t, 0α−k+1
]
= ϕ
f
W1 + x
α
f ωf [T2 O2] (21)
= ϕ
f
W1 + x
α
f ωfW2 = cf , (22)
where 0α−k+1 is a zero row vector of length α− k + 1 and ωfO2 = 0α−k+1.
In the case of Type I, the regeneration method in the proof of Theorem 2 is identical with the method of MSR
Exact-Regeneration [2, Theorem 4], where the zero vector 0α−k+1 and the zero matrix O2 are removed from
Eq.(21) because α = k − 1.
Next, we describe the regeneration for the remaining types IV and V. In the case of Type IV, the reconstruction
is trivial because ci = [ci,1] = U2 and d = 1. In the case of Type V, the failed node connecting any d nodes can
regenerate the share as was stored in itself prior to failure using the method of MBR Exact-Regeneration proposed
by Rashmi et al. [2, Theorem 2] because the message matrix M is symmetric.
III. EXAMPLE
In this section, we give an example to help understanding of the generalized RSK-MSR code and the reconstruction
and the regeneration of the code.
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Let (n, k, d) = (10, 2, 4). Then α = d− k + 1 = 3 and B = kα = 6. From (k, d) = (2, 4), the message matrix
M corresponds to Type III. We can construct a (10, 2, 4) generalized RSK-MSR code over F11 from the following
table for F11.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
F11 ∋ xi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x3i 1 8 5 9 4 7 2 6 3 10
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, we assign the element xi ∈ F11 to node i.
Let
M =


T1 U1 V1
U t1 U2 V2
V t1 V
t
2 O1
T2 O2


=


1 2 3
2 4 5
3 5 0
6 0 0


,
that is, the B = 6 message symbols are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ∈ F11. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, the coding vector is
given as ρ
i
= [1, xi, x
2
i , x
3
i ], and then, the share ci = ρiM of node i is given as

c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10


=


1 1 1 1
1 2 4 8
1 3 9 5
1 4 5 9
1 5 3 4
1 6 3 7
1 7 5 2
1 8 9 6
1 9 4 3
1 10 1 10


M =


1 0 8
10 8 2
9 4 7
1 10 1
0 4 6
9 8 0
9 0 5
3 2 10
5 3 4
7 3 9


.
(Reconstruction: ) A data collector connects to k = 2 nodes {1, 2} to reconstruct the message, and downloads
k = 2 shares c1 and c2. Then, the matrices ΩDC, xDC and ΘDC are given as
ΩDC =

 ω1
ω2

 =

 1
1

 , xDC =

 x1
x2

 =

 1
2

 , ΘDC =

 x21θ1
x22θ2

 =

 1
4

 .
(Step 1: ) Firstly, the data collector recovers V1 and V2 as follows:
V1
V2

 = [ΩDC xDC]−1

c1,3
c2,3

 =

 2 10
10 1



8
2

 =

3
5

 .
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(Step 2: ) Next, the data collector recovers U1 and U2 as follows:
U1
U2

 = [ΩDC xDC]−1



c1,2
c2,2

−ΘDCV t2


=

 2 10
10 1





0
8

−

1
4

 [5]

 =

2
4

 .
(Step 3: ) Finally, the data collector has the following system of linear equations from U1 and V1.
[
ΩDC ΛDCΩDC
]T1
T2

 =

c1,1
c2,1

− [xDC ΘDC]

U t1
V t1


=

 1
10

−

1 1
2 4



2
3

 =

7
5

 ,
where
ΛDC =

x31 0
0 x32

 =

1 0
0 8

 .
By using the method of MSR Data-Reconstruction [2, Theorem 5], the data collector can recover T1 and T2 as
follows: T1 = [1] and T2 = [6].
From the above three steps, the data collector recovers the message matrix M , that is, the data collector
reconstructs the B = 6 message symbols.
(Regeneration: ) Assume that node 1 is a failed node, and node 2, 3, 4 and 5 are d = 4 helper nodes for the
failed node. The failed node obtains the following data of d = 4 symbols for repair from the d = 4 helper nodes.

d1,2
d1,3
d1,4
d1,5


=


c2
c3
c4
c5


ϕt
1
=


9
9
1
10


.
By computing the multiplication of two matrices in the left-hand side of Eq.(20), the failed node has the following
equation.

W1ϕt1
W2ϕ
t
1

 =


ρ
2
ρ
3
ρ
4
ρ
5


−1 

d1,2
d1,3
d1,4
d1,5


=


10 2 4 7
5 8 1 8
2 0 5 4
9 6 5 2




9
9
1
10


=


6
0
8
6


Next, the failed node substitutes the values such that W1ϕt1 = [6, 0, 8]
t and W2ϕt1 = [6] for Eq.(21), and regenerate
the share c1 as follows:
c1 = (W1ϕ
t
1
)t + x31
[
(W2ϕ
t
1
)t, 02
]
= [6, 0, 8] + [6, 0, 0] = [1, 0, 8],
13
where 02 = [0, 0].
IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN {ℓ, ℓ′} SECURE CODES AND GENERALIZED RSK-MSR CODES
In this section, we first describe the concept of the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure code and the construction method proposed
by Shah, Rashmi and Kumar [5]. Next, we show how to apply the construction method of {ℓ, ℓ′} secure code to
the generalized RSK-MSR code. Finally, we explain that the message matrix of the generalized RSK-MSR code is
derived from that of the original RSK-MSR code by using the construction method of the {ℓ = k, ℓ′ = 0} secure
code.
A. {ℓ, ℓ′} Secure Codes based on Product-Matrix MSR Codes
Shah, Rashmi and Kumar [5] proposed the construction methods of the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure codes based on the (n, k, d)
Product-Matrix(PM) MSR codes and the (n, k, d) PM MBR codes, which are proposed by Rashmi et al. [2]. Note
that the (n, k, d) PM MSR code is identical with the (n, k, d) RSK-MSR codes with the (2α×α) message matrix
in the case of Type I.
In [5], the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure codes are defined in the following threat model. An eavesdropper can gain read-access
to the data stored in any set of at-most ℓ(< k) storage nodes. The eavesdropper may also gain read-access to the
data being downloaded during (possibly multiple instances of) repair of some ℓ′(≤ ℓ) of these ℓ nodes. Note that
the data downloaded by a replacement node during any instance of repair also contains the data that is eventually
stored in that node. This is formalized in the following definition [5, Definition 1].
Definition 3 ({ℓ, ℓ′} secure distributed storage system [5]). Consider a distributed storage system in which an
eavesdropper gains access to the data stored in some (ℓ − ℓ′) nodes, and the data stored as well as the data
downloaded during repair in some other ℓ′ nodes. An {ℓ, ℓ′} secure distributed storage system is one in which such
an eavesdropper obtains no information about the message.
We describe the construction method of the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure code [5, Sec. IV-B]. The form of the message matrix
of the (n, k, d) PM MSR code is a (2α× α) matrix
[
S1
S2
]
, where S1 and S2 are (α × α) symmetric matrices. To
construct an {ℓ, ℓ′} secure code based on the (n, k, d = 2k − 2) PM MSR code with (α = k − 1, β = 1, B = kα)
over Fq, in the input to the (n, k, 2k − 2) PM MSR code (without secrecy), a specific, carefully chosen set of
R = ℓα + (k − ℓ)ℓ′ message symbols in the (2α × α) message matrix are replaced with R random symbols as
follows. Each of these random symbols are chosen uniformly and independently from Fq , and are also independent
of the message symbols. Use these R random symbols to replace the following R symbols in the (2α×α) message
matrix
[
S1
S2
]
, to obtain matrix M (s) of the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure code:
• the ℓα−
(
ℓ
2
)
symbols in the first ℓ rows (and hence the first ℓ columns) of the (α× α) symmetric matrix S1,
• the
(
ℓ
2
)
symbols in the intersection of the first (ℓ − 1) rows and the first (ℓ − 1) columns of the (α × α)
symmetric matrix S2,
• the (k − ℓ)ℓ′ remaining symbols in the first ℓ′ rows (and hence the first ℓ′ columns) of S2.
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For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the data stored in node i, i.e., the share ci of node i, is given by ci = [1, xi, x2i , · · · , x2α−1i ]M (s),
where [1, xi, x2i , · · · , x
2α−1
i ] is identical with the coding vector ρi in the case of Type I.
The {ℓ, ℓ′} secure codes guarantee the following secrecy. Let U denote the collection of the (B − R) message
symbols, and let R denote the collection of R random symbols. Further, let E denote the collection of symbols
that an eavesdropper gains access to. And then, the eavesdropper obtains no information about the message from
the data stored in some (ℓ − ℓ′) nodes and the data stored as well as the data downloaded during repair in some
other ℓ′ nodes, that is, the mutual information between the message symbols U and the symbols E obtained by
the eavesdropper is zero, i.e., I(U ; E) = 0, where I(U ; E) denotes a mutual information between U and E , and all
logarithms are taken to the base q.
B. {ℓ, ℓ′} Secure Codes based on Generalized RSK-MSR Codes
In the cases of Type II and III, we show how to apply the construction method of {ℓ, ℓ′} secure code [5, Sec.
IV-B] to the (n, k, d) generalized RSK-MSR code with the (d × α) message matrix M . To construct an {ℓ, ℓ′}
secure code based on the (n, k, d) generalized RSK-MSR code, which has the message matrix of Type II and III,
we use R = ℓα+(k−ℓ)ℓ′ random symbols and (B−R) message symbols. Use these R random symbols to replace
the following R symbols in the (d× α) message matrix M , to obtain matrix M (s) of the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure code:
• the ℓα−
(
ℓ
2
)
symbols in the first ℓ rows (and hence the first ℓ columns) of the (α×α) symmetric matrix W1,
• the
(
ℓ
2
)
symbols in the intersection of the first (ℓ − 1) rows and the first (ℓ − 1) columns of the ((k − 1) ×
(k − 1))symmetric matrix T2,
• the (k − ℓ)ℓ′ remaining symbols in the first ℓ′ rows (and hence the first ℓ′ columns) of T2.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the share ci stored in node i is given by ci = ρiM
(s)
.
C. Relation between message matrices of {ℓ = k, ℓ′ = 0} secure code and (n, k, d) Generalized RSK-MSR Code
We explain that the (d× α) message matrix M of an (n, k, d) generalized RSK-MSR code is derived from that
of the PM MSR code by using the construction method of an {ℓ = k, ℓ′ = 0} secure code.
To construct the (d× α) message matrix M of Type II, III, IV and V, we prepare the (2α× α) message matrix[
S1
S2
]
of an (n̂, k̂, d̂) PM MSR code with (α̂, β̂ = 1, B̂) such that d̂ = 2k̂ − 2, where k̂ = d − k + 2. From the
condition k̂ = d− k + 2, it holds that k̂ = α+ 1, d̂ = 2α and B̂ = k̂α̂ = α(α + 1) ≥ B because α = d − k + 1
and d ≥ 2k − 2, where α = d − k + 1 and B = kα. The (n̂, k̂, d̂) PM MSR code is the underlying code of the
{ℓ = k, ℓ′ = 0} secure code.
Firstly, by using the construction method of {ℓ = k, ℓ′ = 0} secure code, we replace the following B symbols
in the (2α× α) matrix
[
S1
S2
]
with B message symbols as follows:
1) In the cases of Type II and III (i.e., 2 ≤ k ≤ α),
• B −
(
k
2
)
symbols in the first k rows of the (α× α) symmetric matrix S1,
• the
(
k
2
)
symbols in the intersection of the first (k− 1) rows and the first (k− 1) columns of the (α×α)
symmetric matrix S2.
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2) In the cases of Type IV and V (i.e., k = 1), B symbols in the first row of the (α×α) symmetric matrix S1,
where B = d = α.
Next, we replace the remaining (B̂ −B) symbols in the (2α× α) matrix
[
S1
S2
]
with (B̂ −B) zeros.
As a result, we obtain the matrix
[
S1
S2
]
such that the ((α − k + 1) × α) lower sub-matrix of
[
S1
S2
]
is a zero
matrix and the (d× α) upper sub-matrix of
[
S1
S2
]
is identical with the (d× α) message matrix M of the (n, k, d)
generalized RSK-MSR code.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed the construction of (n, k, d) MSR codes for arbitrary (n, k, d) such that d ≥ 2k − 2 and
d ≤ n − 1. The proposed MSR code is the generalized version of the Rashmi-Shah-Kumar Minimum-Storage-
Regenerating(RSK-MSR) code based on the product-matrix framework. In addition, we have described the relations
between the generalized RSK-MSR codes and {ℓ, ℓ′} secure codes.
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